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Analyses of the apartheid dispensation have traditionally taken the nature of South Africa’s 
labour regime seriously. This preoccupation became known as the ‘race-class debate’. 
Initially the Marxist position posited a symbiotic relationship between capitalism and 
apartheid – the regime was all about cheap labour power.1 However, as the spurts of rapid 
economic growth came to an end in the 1970s, scholars became concerned less with the 
functions of apartheid for capitalism, and more with notions of ‘crisis’.2 By the 1990s, 
scholars seemed to move on from these ‘exhausted’ debates. “The race/class debate over the 
relationship between apartheid and capitalism is now passé”, argued Nicoli Nattrass in the 
mid-1990s: “The old dispute between radicals ... and liberals ... is of little more than historical 
interest”. 3 New debates, she argued, had to focus on issues such as industrial restructuring and 
the position of the South African economy in the liberalising international capitalist economy. 
 
With the dismantling of apartheid as a broader social system, it also became important to 
reconstruct the workplace and the economy. The state put in place a range of new institutions 
to “defuse the Molotov cocktail” in the workplace.4 These included national forums for social 
dialogue and a range of new laws to regulate labour relations, minimum conditions of 
employment, employment equity and training systems. Indeed, the state developed some of its 
most coherent policies in order to address the ‘crisis’ brought about by apartheid in the 
workplace. 
 
Hence, we have to consider the nature of the ‘workplace regime’ that is constructed on the 
ruins of the ‘apartheid workplace regime’.5 In order to answer this question, one has to take 
another look at how attempts to reconstruct the workplace, and the contestation generated by 
this, play out. We have to understand these processes as being embedded in certain spatial, 
social and political economic contexts. But it is also important to shake off the parochialism 
entrenched in many analyses of South Africa, and to compare South Africa to other societies 
in transition – specifically other countries in Southern Africa, and in light of this, to 
reconsider past debates. 
 
As will be shown, almost ten years after South Africa’s first democratic elections in 1994, and 
despite a range of policy mechanisms to bring about transformation in the workplace, certain 
                                                 
1 Harold Wolpe, ‘Capitalism and Cheap Labour-power in South Africa: From Segregation to Apartheid’, 
Economy & Society, 1:4 (1972), pp.425-456. 
2 See Stephen Gelb, ‘Making Sense of the Crisis’, Transformation, 5 (1987), pp.33-50; and Stephen Gelb, (ed.), 
South Africa’s Economic Crisis, Cape Town and London: David Phillip and Zed, 1991. 
3 Nicoli Nattrass, ‘Economic Restructuring in South Africa: The Debate Continues’, Journal of Southern African 
Studies, 20:4 (1994), p.517. 
4 Edward Webster, ‘Defusion of the Molotov Cocktail in South African Industrial Relations: The Burden of the 
Past and the Challenge of the Future’, Monographs in Organizational Behavior and Industrial Relations, 25 
(1999), pp.19-58. 
5 See Karl Von Holdt, Transition from Below: Forging Trade Unionism and Workplace Change in South Africa, 
Durban: University of Natal Press, 2003. 
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key elements of the ‘apartheid workplace regime’ remain in place in some of the factories in a 
particular sector of the engineering industry. 6 The way in which the industry’s geography has 
been reconfigured also reinforces an important aspect of the spatial structure of manufacturing 
during the apartheid era. The argument here is not that no change has taken place whatsoever, 
but rather that the transition from apartheid in South Africa to an uncertain future regime is 
not as unproblematic as is often assumed: one can sometimes identify continuities with the 
past in the way that change is taking place. 
 
Indeed, history does not seem to be a linear progression of historical stages, leading to some 
grand finale – Hegel or Marx’s ‘final stage’, when all sharp contradictions cease to exist. In 
his analysis of the beginnings of the South African transition, Francis Fukuyama was pleased 
that the rulers of the apartheid regime were facing up to their liberal democratic future.7 He 
was concerned, however, that the new African National Congress (ANC) government might 
turn its back on the inevitable, and return to the past. In recent times, such a neoliberal 
metanarrative – often expressed in the language of globalisation – has forcefully reasserted a 
teleological view of history. Many analyses of how Africa ‘responds’ to globalisation have 
reintroduced the logic of modernisation theory. As Frederick Cooper points out: 
For all its emphasis on the newness of the last quarter-century, the current interest 
in the concept of globalization recalls a similar infatuation in the 1950s and 
1960s: modernization. Both [emphasise] a process, not necessarily fully realised 
yet but ongoing and probably inevitable. Both name the process by its supposed 
endpoint. Both were inspired by a clearly valid and compelling observation – that 
change is rapid and pervasive – and both depend for their evocative power on a 
sense that change is not a series of disparate elements but the movement of them 
in a common direction. 8 
The modernisation of Africa is read from the text written by the former colonial masters, who 
seemingly ‘opened up’ African societies to the logic of modernisation. 9 
 
In South Africa, this logic was latched onto by a group of policy researchers, some of them 
trained in the discipline of developmental economics. The task, they argued, was for South 
Africa to “meet the global challenge”. 10 Representing South Africa as a special case – as 
somehow being exceptiona l in the context of colonial Southern Africa – has enabled an 
understanding of South Africa as a racial Fordist system being transformed into a non-racial 
post-Fordist one (see Table 1). 
 
This process is seemingly driven by the power of political democratisation and trade 
liberalisation. Indeed, this perspective has also become dominant in South African studies of 
the workplace. South African exceptionalism allows one to construct the country’s transition 
as one that presents a radical break with the past. Thus, South Africa can become a special 
                                                 
6 To maintain the anonymity of the workers interviewed here, we do not identify the particular sub-sector or any 
of the factories where the research was carried out. 
7 Francis Fukuyama, ‘The Next South Africa’, The National Interest, 18 (1991), pp.13-27. 
8 Frederick Cooper, ‘What is the Concept of Globalization Good For? An African Historian’s Perspective’, 
African Affairs, 100 (2002), p.196. 
9 See Cooper (2002), p.205. 
10 See Avril Joffe, et al., ‘Meeting the Global Challenge: A Framework for Industrial Revival in South Africa’, 
Industrial Relations Journal of South Africa, 14:2/3 (1994), pp.88-127; Improving Manufacturing Performance 
in South Africa: Report of the Industrial Strategy Project, Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press, 1995; 
and ‘South Africa’s Industrialization: The Challenge Facing Labour’, in S. Frenkel & J. Harrod (eds), 
Industrialization and Labour Relations: Contemporary Research in Seven Countries, Ithaca: ILR Press, 1995. 
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case – one that potentially represents a “beacon” for the rest of the post-colonial world, rather 
than a “mirror”. 11 
 
Table 1 - Post-Fordist ‘common sense’ view of the transition 
Source: G. Hart, Disabling Globalization: Places of Power in Post-Apartheid South Africa. Pietermaritzburg: 
University of Natal Press, 2002, p.25 
 
Apartheid Post-apartheid 
State Market 
Repression Freedom 
Racial Fordism Non-racial post-Fordism 
Rigidity Flexibility 
 
Thus, as Mamdani has argued, the history of South Africa’s transition is written as a history 
“by analogy”. 12 Indeed, as James Ferguson has pointed out in his study of the Zambian copper 
mines, history is not made up of progressive stages. Working classes can be made and 
unmade.13 In the Zambian copper fields – formerly the analogous ‘Manchester of Africa’, 
where there were high expectations of the modernising force of mining – ‘modernity’ is 
nostalgically remembered as something of the past. And indeed, as Cooper has shown, 
proletarianisation in Africa under the colonial regimes of both the French and the British took 
on its own dynamic – resembling what some would call “partial proletarianisation”. 14 It was 
linked to a simultaneous logic of inclusion and exclusion. As Cooper argues elsewhere: 
[C]olonial territories were highly disarticulated politically, socially and 
economically: colonisers made their money by focusing on investment and 
infrastructure on extremely narrow, largely extractive, forms of production and 
exchange. They taught some indigenous peoples some of what they needed to 
interact with Europeans, and then tried to isolate them from others whose division 
into allegedly distinct cultural and political units (‘tribes’) was emphasised and 
institutionalised…15   
 
The analys is presented in this paper is based on a study of seven factories in one sector of the 
engineering industry in South Africa, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. This sector has been under 
considerable pressure following the rapid reduction in import tariffs, the unbundling of a 
number of South African conglomerates during which manufacturing operations were 
rationalised or sold off, as well as an increase in the cost of inputs – notably steel. As a result, 
imports of such products into South Africa have increased, while local players have been 
unable to penetrate export markets. Also, a number of firms were liquidated.  
 
Based on a total of seventy semi-structured personal interviews conducted with members of 
management, trade unions, and union officials in the seven remaining factories in the sector 
(see Table 2), an attempt is made to consider the problematic of reconstruction at the level of 
                                                 
11 See Gay Seidman, ‘Is South Africa Different? Sociological Comparisons and Theoretical Contributions from 
the Land of Apartheid’, Annual Review of Sociology, 25 (1999), pp.419-440. 
12 Mahmood Mamd ani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism, Cape 
Town: David Philip, 1996. 
13 James Ferguson, Expectations of Modernity: Myths and Meanings of Urban Life in Zambia’s Copperbelt, 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. 
14 Frederick Cooper, Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. See also I. Brandell, Workers in Third World Industrialisation, 
London: MacMillan, 1991. 
15 Cooper (2002), pp.205-206. 
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the workplace. If the ‘apartheid workplace regime’ was constituted on (i) a racial division of 
labour, (ii) a racial structure of power supplemented by attempts to incorporate a colonial 
construction of ‘ethnicity’ in supervision, (iii) a system of migrant labour, (iv) the racial 
segregation of facilities, and (v) a location of workplaces in a bifurcated industrial geography, 
what kind of workplace regime is constructed on the ruins of this?16 These five elements of 
the ‘apartheid workplace regime’ are each considered here, and this perspective on the past is 
used as a mirror to contrast present day transformations. Indeed, can we talk about a post-
apartheid workplace regime, or, as Von Holdt contends, are we seeing the emergence of a 
neo-apartheid workplace regime?17 
 
 
Table 2 - Background information about engineering factories included in the study 
 
 Number of employees Ownership Comments  
Factory A 
(South Africa) 
1 300 Owned by a South African 
consortium, including the 
directors 
Factories A, B & C are all part of 
one group of companies. 
Factory B  
(South Africa) 
470 Owned by a South African 
consortium 
 
Factory C 
(South Africa) 
600 Owned by a South African 
consortium 
 
Factory D 
(South Africa) 
900 Owned by a US 
multinational corporation 
The multinational corporation 
bought the operations from a loss-
making South African firm in the 
mid-1990s. 
Factory E 
(Zimbabwe) 
170 Owned by local 
Zimbabwean consortium, 
including the directors 
Factory E was in the process of 
losing its market share to Factory F. 
Operations only operated at about 
50% of its capacity. Operations of 
both factories were severely 
hampered by political and economic 
chaos in Zimbabwe. 
Factory F 
(Zimbabwe) 
250 Owned by Zimbabwean 
consortium, listed on the 
Zimbabwean stock 
exchange 
 
Factory G 
(Swaziland) 
436 Owned by a South African 
consortium, including 
directors 
 
 
 
The Racial Division Of Labour 
A first characteristic of the apartheid workplace regime is the racial division of labour. 
‘Black’ workers initially occupied the positions of labourers and assistants to artisans. Later 
on they became semi-skilled operators.18 ‘Whites’ were artisans and managers – including 
foremen, who supervised ‘black’ production workers. These foremen were assisted by ‘black’ 
                                                 
16 The first four characteristics of the apartheid workplace regime mentioned here were developed by Von Holdt 
(2003). The fifth characteristic of the apartheid industrial geography is added here.  
17 Von Holdt (2003). 
18 See Edward Webster, Cast in a Racial Mould: Labour Process and Trade Unionism in the Foundries, 
Johannesburg: Ravan, 1985. 
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indunas or baas-boys.19 In the administrative departments, a similar colour bar was 
maintained – no ‘white’ employee could be trained by a ‘black’ assistant training officer, for 
example. Whilst ‘black’ workers were not allowed to be trained as artisans, on an informal 
level they often possessed the practical skill to do these jobs, because “their white superiors 
were frequently too lazy or ignorant to perform their own work”.20 From there emerges 
Leger’s and Adler’s criticisms of the reference to ‘unskilled’ production workers and the 
notion of “tacit skill”.21 Yet, while these skills were not formally recognised, ‘black’ workers 
often had to teach new ‘white’ recruits how to do their jobs. These same recruits then became 
their supervisors. But, as Von Holdt points out, “while the racial division of labour was rigid, 
it was not static”. Indeed, “racial boundaries shifted over time in response to changes in 
production processes and changes in the labour market”. 22 
 
Post-Fordists posited that increased competition would force South African manufacturing 
firms to construct workplace regimes based on non-adversarial industrial relations and 
participative managerial styles – ‘team work’, ‘multi-skilling’, and ‘flexibility’, and later on 
‘world class manufacturing’, would become buzz words from the mid-1990s onwards.23 
Whilst some of these words were used ‘in theory’ in this sector of the engineering industry, as 
one worker argued, ‘in practice’ the workplace regime operated on a different logic. 
 
Since the early 1990s, this industry has not managed to become export-oriented. Instead, 
imports have increased rapidly. A number of South African firms were liquidated as a result, 
and the remaining factories were able to increase their market share somewhat. But this 
process did not lead to a wholesale reorganisation of production. Instead, work was 
intensified by adding additional shifts in some departments, the linking of performance to 
production bonuses, and by the piecemeal introduction of new machinery. The training of 
workers was not generally considered to be an important priority, leading to significant 
conflict between management and the trade unions. Indeed, during 2002, workers at one  
company went on a month- long strike. The strike related to what was called ‘wage 
anomalies’. 
 
                                                 
19 ‘Baas’ means ‘boss’, but implies an imp ortant element of white supremacy – a more accurate translation might 
be ‘master’, rather than ‘boss’. The English version, ‘boss-boy’, is also sometimes used. According to the 
Chamber of Mines’ English-Afrikaans-Fanakalo dictionary, ‘baas’ is translated as ‘bas’ in Fanakalo. The 
Fanakalo ‘bas boy’ is translated to ‘baasjong’ or ‘voorjong’ in Afrikaans. The Afrikaans translation for 
‘supervisor’ would be ‘voorman’ – which is already a gendered translation. But Africans are not considered to be 
‘men’ here – the word ‘jong’ is used instead, which literally means ‘young’. This is similar to the colonial use of 
‘boy’ in English. In the same dictionary, the different versions for what later became a ‘machine operator’ are 
‘machine boy’ (English), ‘boorjong’ (Afrikaans) and ‘mtshin boy’ (Fanakalo). The translation for ‘miner’ (in 
English ‘ganger’ is presented as a synonym) is simply ‘bas’. A ‘fitter’ (‘passer’ in Afrikaans), is translated as 
‘bas ka lo fitas’, a ‘shaft timberman’ is a ‘bas ka lo tshaf’. Here we can see how certain jobs implied a certain 
racial category. A ‘miner’ can only be a ‘baas’. In fact, the two concepts were synonymous. See Chamber of 
Mines of South Africa, Miners’ Dictionary – Woordeboek vir Myners, 1969 
20 Von Holdt (2003), p.29. 
21 Jean Leger, ‘“Talking Rocks”: An Investigation of the Pit Sense of Rockfall Accidents Amongst Underground 
Gold Miners.’ PhD thesis, Arts Faculty, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 1992; Glenn Adler, 
‘Skills, Control and Careers at Work: Possibilities for Worker Control in the South African Motor Industry’, 
South African Sociological Review, 5:2 (1993), pp.35-64. 
22 Von Holdt (2003), p.29. 
23 See Joachim Ewert, ‘Training for “World Class Manufacturing”: Rhetoric and Reality in the South African 
Engineering Industry’, South African Journal of Labour Relations, 21:2 (1997), pp.25-41; Mark Hunter, ‘The 
Post-Fordist High Road?: A South African Case Study’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 18:1 (2000), 
pp.67-90. 
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Indeed, the grading of jobs, and the linking of payment to those jobs, were very explosive 
issues when the interviews were conducted at the factories in South Africa. Considerable 
tension was caused by the fact that the company had moved from the Paterson grading system 
to the one prescribed by the Bargaining Council for the industry. A worker explained:  
Before they were using the Paterson system, which was grade one to ten. Then, 
suddenly last year, the company [decided] to use the NIC [National Industrial 
Council]24 system, which has thirteen grades...  
Apart from the complaint that the trade union was not consulted about this change, there were 
problems with “balancing these grades as they transform them from the Paterson system”. 
One interviewee described the move from Paterson to the NIC system as “a fuck-up”, and 
another explained:  
On the Paterson system I was grade five and the other worker was grade six, but 
when we are transformed to [the] NIC [system], we are classified on the same 
grade, which is Grade G. Sometimes then we all become Grade G, but we are 
earning different rates. 
Another said:  
The grading-system is totally corrupt, because we’ve got thirteen grades here and 
everybody here is not paid the same. Like the one artisan assistant, he’s getting 
paid R18.57 the other one is getting paid R12.00.  
There was also a feeling that the exercise was used to cut wages, and the result of this were 
the mentioned ‘grade anomalies’: 
It’s terrible, terrible… You see, when people are doing the same thing, but their 
rate of pay on that [grade] is not the same… So we have been trying to sort this 
thing out, but [it’s given us hard times]. Because we believe that, as the law states, 
if we’re doing the same job, we’re supposed to get [the] same rate of pay.  
Workers felt that there were not clear procedures, that often the system was very arbitrary, 
and that this opened an opportunity for favouritism. 
 
Thus far the situation might seem like teething problems following the introduction of a new 
grading system. However, ‘grade anomalies’ and allegations of ‘favouritism’ have an 
important ‘racial’ sub-text: 
The grading system is buggered because, if I can put it to you that way, it is still 
the old apartheid regime… You take the F-grade here, [in one department], where 
only coloureds work. [Then] you take F-grade in dispatch [where blacks work]. In 
dispatch they will be getting only R11.27 [an hour]… in [the other department] 
they will get R12.80, but they’re both F-grade... These coloured people in F-grade 
are getting more money than the black people in dispatch. But the white people 
who [used] to work in material handling… they are also F-grade but they are 
getting R30 to R40 [an hour]. 
At another factory, an interviewee had the following perspective: 
[R]acism will always be everywhere in a way… But it’s not [always] that obvious 
[here]. But there was a big issue on grades and race, you know? It’s like the 
                                                 
24 Before the promulgation of the Labour Relations Act of 1995, Bargaining Councils were known as Industrial 
Councils. 
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Indians were getting better grades, you see? But sometimes it does happen, 
because when I came here it was something like fifty blacks and thirty Indians… I 
don’t know how they rated [the whole thing]. But mostly those Indians got better 
grades. It’s either because they applied for those positions that came up, or they 
just somehow got the jobs. But the thing is not every position gets advertised. So 
you just see someone working on higher grade and you don’t even know how the 
hell did he get there! 
There was very strong support among workers at the South African factories for the ‘broad 
banded’ system consisting only of five grades proposed by National Union of Metalworkers 
of South Africa (NUMSA) in the late 1990s and the early 2000s. They saw a more 
standardised system, with clear procedures, as a way to fight discrimination based on arbitrary 
decisions by management. When the training of workers is linked to career paths, workers 
could advance in the workplace. One interviewee commented:  
This is what we have been arguing about, just because they have trained some 
employees here. When there are some vacancies they don’t put them there, they 
just [take people] from outside… 
 
In Zimbabwe, the grading system used by factories is prescribed by the National Employment 
Council (NEC), a body where employers consult trade unions on matters such as wage 
increases. These councils are a legacy of the state corporatist industrial relations system 
introduced by the post- liberation regime. The grading system resembles the Paterson model to 
a large extent. Grades are linked to the jobs that employees perform, and not to an employee’s 
levels of competency.  
 
At the factory in Swaziland, most interviewees were unaware of the nature of their grading 
system. Someone in the Human Resources department was able to confirm that the Paterson 
system was used. Most factory workers fell within the A-band, which is the lowest in the 
system. One employee, who was interviewed off the factory premises, held the opinion that 
white and African employees in similar grades, as in South Africa, were paid different wages. 
According to him, white employees were paid up to eleven times the salaries of African 
employees in similar grades. However, this could not be verified independently. 
 
At all the South African factories, ‘black’ employees have steadily been promoted to the level 
of ‘supervisor’. However, the level of ‘superintendent’ still remained the domain of mostly 
‘white’ employees. “There is an improvement, because since I came here”, said one worker, 
“I think there were one or two African supervisors, but now… maybe we’ve got about five or 
six African supervisors”. In the past, he said: 
supervisory vacancies were… for coloureds and Indians only, and jobs like tool-
setter, which are highly skilled jobs, or quality controllers, were reserved for 
Indians and coloureds only. But now there are Africans. 
Another said: 
In [one department] there used to be coloured supervisors in the past. Now there 
are… two [Africans] on this shift, and there’s one on the other shift – [so] there 
[are] three African supervisor… There’s an African superintendent [there], he is 
nightshift… I mean when it comes for there downwards, that’s where they 
actually balance the issue of the employment equity, but at the top they don’t. 
Another felt that the supervisory level was still dominated by ‘coloureds’ and ‘Indians’:  
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Now there are more Indian supervisors, or I should bind them together and say 
coloureds and Indians. The African supervisors I can count them and tell you it is 
so and so, so and so. When it comes to Indian and coloureds I [cannot] count 
[them] - they are more. 
 
However, whilst African workers have steadily been promoted to the supervisory level, 
workers felt that they did not have real authority to conduct their work. Others felt that they 
were under-qualified for their jobs, and that was why management was able to undermine 
their positions. One explained:  
I can take you to [our] department, you can see the top level management 
disregarding the supervisor and the superintendent and [going] straight to the 
workforce, and say: “Kom, kom, kom! Work! Do your job! What’s wrong?” 
[This] is unacceptable.  
He also felt that this did not happen in the past, when supervisors were mostly coloured and 
Indian. At a number of factories, interviewees echoed this view: “you find that the manager 
comes from top to you, instead of maybe go to the supervisor, and the supervisor must tell 
you [what to do]”. And: 
[From] the supervisors, to the foremen, to the manager - that chain is not that 
good, because if you say you are my manager, you believe in me that I can 
supervise. So you are able to give me instructions that I need my production at the 
end of the week: ‘I need so much from you. So you must communicate with your 
operator so that I will achieve this production.’ But you’ll find that a manager 
goes [to] stay in his office, [and then] he comes and gives instructions to the 
operators, which is wrong. He is supposed to give the instructions to the 
foremen25, the foremen must take it to the supervisor. You see, that chain of 
communication [does] not exist at all, more especially in my department. I don’t 
know in other departments, but in my department that chain of communication 
does not exist. 
 
Another said: “We want black people to be supervisors, then fine, they will be supervisors. 
[But] in some areas they are not recognised”. One interviewee went so far as to use the term 
“glorified supervisors”: 
I would say the supervisors in this company, I do not know their credentials. 
[Some]… are promoted to be a supervisor, but I’m not sure whether the company 
gives them enough training [or if] they send them to some institution where 
they’re going to learn the skills of being a supervisor, what a supervisor is like. 
Really, their credentials are not known to me… Hey! The company is full of 
glorified supervisors… 
Ironically, the union was in the process of taking up this matter with one of the companies: 
They [supervisors] are not empowered, although as the union we are trying to 
enforce that. We’ve got a dispute pertaining the way they’re managing the 
factory... I think there is progress, because we have agreed with management last 
week that there will be weekly meetings, [which] will involve shop stewards, 
supervisors, and one or two of the workforce… And then monthly then we will 
                                                 
25 Also known as ‘superintendents’. 
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meet with the top level and discuss the outcome of our weekly meeting. So, we 
hope that maybe there will be change. 
 
However, he was quite sceptical about the potential for such a process to make a significant 
impact, since it was part of ongoing attempts to address a whole range of issues, which 
included the issue of ‘grade anomalies’, and the perception of the workforce that the 
intensification of work had reached unacceptable levels. Indeed, the dispute resulted in a 
strike. 
 
A young interviewee, who was appointed as a contract worker, felt that the African 
supervisors were from an older generation who had not changed with time: 
[M]ostly people who are on supervisory positions right now are the old people 
from the old regime. For them language may be more of a problem than it is 
maybe for us. And for us, we see things much more easy and it’s like if you do 
have a problem, you just say it right there and then. For them, you know, they just 
keep quiet for some time and maybe handle it later. 
At the level of management above the level of supervision, there were very few Africans at 
any of the factories. One interviewee said: 
We’ve got only one African guy who is a manager, just a stupid manager, [who] 
does not have power - he cannot decide [anything]… Can you imagine an IR 
manager taking instructions and report to the operations manager, a person who 
knows nothing about the Act, a person who cannot even tell you where the 
CCMA office is in town? But you take instructions from him!’ 
 
At a factory in the Eastern Cape, some workers also felt that Africans who were appointed in 
the Human Resources department were not taken seriously by the company:  
In the past we [had] two black HR Managers. The reason why they left is because 
[for] all the years the HR managers used to get [a] car allowance, but they didn’t 
get [it]. So automatically you think to yourself: ‘No man, there’s definitely 
[something wrong], and if you push for something, definitely you’re not going to 
get it - you’re black.’ You understand? You see, you [ride a taxi], that’s your 
problem. 
 
At another factory, all the supervisors were ‘black’. About management, however, an 
interviewee said: “There’s only one management here: all [are] white”. When asked about the 
African human resources manager, he answered: “No [he] is not regarded as a manager… 
They say he’s a Human Resources Manager but he’s not given a power to be like that.” But 
there was another African manager at this factory that this worker did not mention. Another 
interviewee had to point out that there was an African production manager. He did not 
consider him to be more approachable than the ‘white’ managers, and called him “the 
oppressor”:  
He is an oppressor, because if maybe there is a problem, even from the 
management, you’ll find that he points [to] a worker inside… Even if maybe there 
is something that the company want to give us, he is the one that is a stumbling 
block… because [he says] now [they] spoil the people….  As a black manager, he 
is the one who is supposed to fight for us. [But] he’s not doing that. [I’m not 
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saying that] if you are a black manager, you [should] fight for me, even if I am 
wrong - if I’m wrong I’m wrong. 
 
Regarding the appointment of managers, an interviewee described his concerns as follows: 
We don’t know whether we have an Equity Committee or not…There are issues 
that are supposed to be discussed on the Equity Committee. There is the question 
of promotions, because one of the problems we have is that some of the 
promotions on the managerial level are not discussed [at the committee]. If they 
are going to advertise a post for a supervisor, a QC [quality controller], a team 
leader or a superintendent - those posts are discussed on the Equity Committee. 
When it comes to managerial positions, it does not discuss [appointments]… They 
just decide to advertise, to do interviews and appoint whoever they want to 
appoint… Most of the people are being appointed [because of] their connections. 
There are people who have been working for this company ages ago, who decided 
to take a package. But most of them are back now… And you can not find an 
African guy or Indian or a coloured in a top position. We’ve got only one African 
manager, an IR manager, and only one Indian lady [who] is a manager at [the] 
stores. Those are the only two. Most of them are whites.  
 
Workers generally felt that they were still regarded as ‘second class’ employees: 
The black employees in this factory are not taken into account as a people who are 
in the company, who’re making the production or making the money in the 
company. There is nothing good for them. There are no benefits they get as the 
employees of the company… If the company can remove discrimination… 
everything would be alright, because if I see something, someone can listen to me.  
 
The picture looked different in Zimbabwe, but there was an important difference between the 
two factories studied there. One company was considered to be a ‘black’ company, while the 
other was ‘white’. At the two factories, dynamics regarding race also differed. At the first, 
there were no ‘white’ employees. The CEO and the managing director, for example, were 
African. A worker who had worked at the firm for more than thirty years said that conditions 
at the factory had improved vastly after independence. Whilst there was a feeling that factory 
management was very authoritarian, the relationships between workers, supervisors and 
management at this factory seemed more cordial than at the South African plants. An 
interviewee mentioned a certain ‘Mr T’, a ‘white’ person, who had worked as a manager to 
implement new production equipment: “It was not an issue. We worked on an equal footing”, 
he said. 
 
At the second firm, the situation resembled some of the dynamics found in the South African 
factories. Up until around 1994, supervisors were ‘mixed’. From then onwards, supervisors, 
like ordinary factory workers, became mostly Africans. The management level was also 
‘mixed’, but the Chief Executive Officer and the Managing Director were both ‘white’ 
Zimbabweans. Workers also held the perception that ‘black’ and ‘white’ employees on 
similar grades were paid differential salaries. Again, this could not be verified independently. 
 
In Swaziland, an employee who had worked in engineering factories in Zimbabwe, South 
Africa, and then finally Swaziland, was asked to compare his experiences. “In Zimbabwe, 
factories are often run by blacks”, he said. However, “here and there, whites still controlled”. 
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Swaziland and South Africa were similar in his view. From the level of superintendent up to 
management, whites, coloured and Indians dominated positions. In South Africa he found it 
peculiar that “the appointment of relatives in highly paid, unproductive jobs” was quite 
common. Another worker at this factory felt that Swaziland was less xenophobic than South 
Africa. According to him, rather than racism, favouritism among supervisors, team leaders 
and workers was more of an issue. The factory there, like the ones in Zimbabwe, did not have 
superintendents interpositioned between supervisors and management. Workers and 
supervisors were mostly Africans, whilst management were all white and Indian, except for 
one African. According to a worker who had previously worked in South Africa, it was “not 
different from South Africa. It is the same”. One employee had a culturalist explanation for 
the absence of more African managers:  
It is not race, it is more like a cultural thing. Swazi’s are known to be people who 
are polite, humble and all that jazz… But it is changing about now. Swazi’s are 
also not confident in higher positions. We want to rely on someone else to make 
the decisions. 
 
Hence, in the context of the removal of formal legislation that imposed racial hierarchies, and 
the introduction of new legislation that attempted to redress the racial legacies, there seems to 
be a competing logic – a more informal one – that still operates in the workplace. Disputes 
about grading systems reveal that this logic still holds, and that it is justified that different 
‘races’ should receive different wages, even when, on a formal level, they perform the jobs 
that are graded equally. One might call this an informal wage colour bar. Also, in the context 
of a breakdown in the formal colour bar of the apartheid era, Africans are appointed in higher 
positions – specifically as supervisors, but also in some managerial positions. Indeed, this 
slow process of deracialisation started from the early 1970s, as Nzimande showed.26 
However, workers often question whether these new supervisors and managers have real 
authority. The process resembles the upward floating colour bar already identified by 
Burawoy in Zambia in the early 1970s.27 
 
 
Racial Structure Of Power 
A second characteristic of the apartheid workplace regime is the racial structure of power in 
the workplace. This refers to the idea of baasskap28 – any black person was by definition a 
servant of any white person, no matter what their position in the formal hierarchy. Von Holdt 
traces this back to “deep colonial roots”, where ‘blacks’ were seen as “servants of whites”. He 
argues: 
The relationship between managerial authority and the racial structure of power 
was complex. Not all whites were managers. However, any white had the ‘right’ 
to issue instructions to any black. This meant that there was no clear line of 
managerial authority or job demarcation – at least, as applied to black workers. 
White men made the rules and the cardinal rule for black workers was ‘to obey 
that man’s rules’, however arbitrary or senseless. For black workers this rule spelt 
                                                 
26 Blade Nzimande, ‘“The Corporate Guerrillas” – Class Formation and the African Petty Bourgeoisie in Post-
1973 South Africa’, PhD thesis, University of Natal, Durban, 1991. 
27 Michael Burawoy, The Colour of Class on the Copper Mines: From African Advancement to Zambianization, 
Lusaka: Institute for African Studies, 1972. 
28 Literally translated, this means ‘boss-hood’, or ‘being-the-master’. 
 12
extreme insecurity: one white man’s rule might contradict another’s, and in trying 
to follow both a worker was bound to transgress one or other instruction. 29 
 
As pointed out by Burawoy, baasskap was often violently enforced,30 but also supported by 
the ability of supervisors to arbitrarily dismiss any ‘black’ worker without recourse to 
procedure, or by withholding bonuses for offences such as ‘coming late’ or 
‘insubordination’.31 
 
Positioned in a dubious role between the ‘white’ supervisors and ‘black’ workers was the 
baas-boy, or the induna. Often ‘white’ supervisors were unable to speak an African language, 
and ‘black’ workers could often not speak English or Afrikaans. Thus an old colonial practice 
– what Mahmood Mamdani calls “decentralised despotism” – was also employed in the 
workplace itself. British colonisers called this system of manipulating traditional leaders 
‘indirect rule’ and the French called it ‘association’.32 Von Holdt points out that the 
deployment of the term induna:  
...reflects white efforts to affirm, strengthen or if necessary even create, traditional 
and ethnic identities for blacks as a bulwark against ‘modernisation’ and its 
attendant demand for modern rights such as democracy or trade unions.33  
But unlike ‘traditional chiefs’ in the rural parts of the colonies, these indunas did not bridge 
the physical space between the village and the city, but the social space between the worlds of 
supervisors and workers. The (often brutal) power of baas-boys was derived from the 
positions of the ‘white’ supervisors and their role in the system as a whole. Their role was 
seldom a hegemonic one – no wonder they were sometimes called impimpis34, and not 
indunas, by workers. 
 
But from the 1970s, trade unions were already challenging the arbitrary nature of decisions 
made under colonial despotism. Industrial relations procedures were put in place, and this was 
formalised firmly under the new Constitution and a new set of labour laws. In Zimbabwe, the 
post-independence government introduced stringent procedures to limit arbitrary 
retrenchment exercises and dismissals. However, whilst ‘permanent employees’ now enjoy 
the protection of labour law, at all the factories, a significant proportion of employees have 
been appointed on ‘fixed-term’ or temporary contracts. At one factory in South Africa, these 
workers are known as ‘STCs’ – short for ‘short term contractors’. It is especially during times 
when production has to increase that these STCs are employed by the companies. When 
workers are recruited for permanent positions, they are usually recruited from the ranks of the 
STCs. But often, workers work ‘permanently’ on a ‘temporary’ basis, as one worker pointed 
out: 
It depends on the market - if the volumes are high, maybe, for a period of more 
than six months. If you start, it should be a short term contract for a period of 
three months. If you exceed six months, you get a permanent position. But it 
depends on the market… Currently they are plus-minus five hundred - that’s why 
I am saying it depends on the market. Like last year the company managed to 
                                                 
29 Von Ho ldt (2003), p.31. 
30 Burawoy (1972); and The Politics of Production, London: Verso, 1985. 
31 Von Holdt (2003), pp.32-33. 
32 Mamdani (1996), p.7. 
33 Von Holdt (2003), p.35. 
34 ‘Informers’. 
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employ more than four hundred casual workers. Most of them were on a short 
term contacts, which expired at the end of last year. 
 
At another factory, an interviewee explained that some employees were employed on a 
month-to-month basis. They were called ‘contract workers’. According to him “some of these 
contract workers are working here up to three years”, without being made permanent. Another 
worker from yet another factory explained the ‘strategy’ as follows: 
What they do, if the contractor has worked say for six months, they will terminate 
the contract. And then they would say: ‘No, they don’t have the job for the 
contract anymore.’ All of a sudden, after two or three weeks, they will say they 
need those contractors back again. You see, [that is] the strategy they are using. 
At another factory, an interviewee explained it as follows: 
Actually, every month they used to renew their contracts… Let me say, you’ll be 
here about three months, or four months, which means [for that time] they will 
renew the contract. But you’ll find that maybe others they are crying about that. 
Maybe after six or seven months I’m still [on] a contract, you see?  
 
A contract worker explained the rationale behind the employment of her estimation of two 
hundred contract workers at the factory as follows:  
I think the company doesn’t want to pay. That’s why they employ contractors… 
[I]t’s cheaper, because when they don’t want them again they just tell them: 
“Your closing date is in June. We are taking you away. We don’t want you 
anymore.” It’s easy for them – rather than [with] permanent [workers, where] they 
have to go through some stages. 
 
But this segmentation of internal labour markets was not peculiar to the factories in South 
Africa. At the two factories in Zimbabwe and the factory in Swaziland a similar system is 
used. At the factory in Swaziland, when the interviews were conducted, there were 436 
employees. Of these, 193 were appointed on monthly contracts. One interviewee referred to 
these workers as “seasonals”. At a factory in Harare, of a factory staff component of 170, 60% 
were appointed on a permanent basis, and the rest were appointed on contracts that were 
renewed every six weeks. These contracts meant that the company could give workers 24 
hours notice. At the other factory, of a total workforce of 250 employees, only about 100 were 
on permanent contracts. The rest were all contract workers, whose contracts were renewed on 
a monthly basis. According to the production manager, the company had a policy to appoint 
new staff ‘every year’. Table 3 provides a summary of how ‘fixed term’ contracts operate at 
the different factories. Proportions of contract workers range from 25% of all employees at 
one plant to a staggering 60% at a factory in Harare. 
 
At none of the factories did trade unions actively recruit contract workers as members. At one 
of the factories, an interviewee even went so far as to suggest that “[t]he only difference 
[between] contract and permanent [workers] I think is being a member of the union - having a 
card and everything; that’s the only difference”. According to her “[e]verything [else] is just 
the same”. 
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Table 3 - Permanent Employees and Fixed Term Contact Workers  
Source: Interviews with managers, shop stewards, and meetings with shop steward committees.35 
 
 Number of employees 
Permanent 
employees 
‘Contract’ 
employees Comments  
Factory A 
(SA) 
1 300 800 500 
(38%) 
Short term contracts for 
duration of 3 months; 
Some ‘toolmakers’ and 
‘electricians’ sourced by labour 
contractors 
Factory B  
(SA) 
470 350 120 
(26%) 
Monthly contracts introduced 
in 1996, when output 
increased; 
Some casuals used to fill in for 
absent workers; 
Contractors sometimes used for 
special projects  
Factory C 
(SA) 
600 450 150 
(25%) 
Monthly contracts renewed for 
up to 6 months; 
System introduced in 2000; 
At components factory, 80 
permanent employees and 160 
(66%) contract employees 
Factory D 
(SA) 
900 480 420 
(47%) 
Monthly contracts; 
New employees hired on 
contract basis, and 
subsequently laid off 
Factory E 
(Zimbabwe) 
170 100 70 
(40%) 
Six-week contracts, can be 
given 24 hour notice; 
Employment agencies used for 
skilled staff 
Factory F 
(Zimbabwe) 
250 100 150 
(60%) 
Monthly contracts 
Factory G 
(Swaziland) 
436 243 193 
(44%) 
‘Seasonal’ workers employed 
on a monthly basis 
 
 
Hence, an important element of colonial despotism is retained in the new regime. Whilst a 
significant segment of ‘permanent’ workers have retained some form of security, a third of all 
employees employed are in insecure temporary jobs. But even with permanent workers, their 
‘permanence’ is under constant threat because of firm closures. They are constantly reminded 
of this as managers employ the language of globalisation. 
 
 
Migrant Labour  
A third characteristic of the apartheid workplace regime is what Mamdani would call “the 
rural in the urban”. 36 The workforce at the steel mill in Witbank studied by Von Holdt was 
divided – or segmented – into workers who had lived in the local township for some time, and 
                                                 
35 Since employment levels tend to vary, these figures reflect staffing levels for when the interviews were 
conducted at the factories. 
36 Mamdani (1996), p.30. 
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migrant workers who were housed in a hostel administrated by the local municipality. 37 These 
two categories of workers did not only live in two distinct social spheres, but they were 
consciously allocated to different positions inside the workplace by management. According 
to Von Holdt, “migrants were preferred for jobs in hot, dangerous places such as the iron 
plant tap floors or the steel plant furnaces, and for hard labour… Locals were recruited for 
“softer” jobs – such as artisan assistants”. 38 He explains: 
This differentiated recruiting strategy was related to control, discipline and cost in 
the workplace. For migrant workers, pressed upon by the large reserve army of 
labour penned up in bantustans, and desperate for work, dismissal or non-renewal 
of a contract would be disaster. This imposed on them the discipline to accept the 
toughest and most gruelling work, at the lowest pay, and under harsh 
treatment….39 
 
Migrant labour remains a key characteristic of the current Southern African labour market. 
However, in this industry, migrant labour is not a major feature any longer. One of the firms 
had an on-site hostel in the past. Losing your job at this company also meant losing your 
accommodation in the city, and this was used to keep workers compliant. But this system is 
no longer used. However, the segmentation of the labour market into ‘permanent’ and 
‘contract’ employees maintain some of the workplace-based dynamics of the migrant labour 
system. 
 
 
Racial Segregation Of Facilities 
A fourth characteristic of the apartheid workplace regime is the racial segregation of facilities. 
Up to 1983, this was formally legislated by government. However, as Von Holdt points out, 
when this legislation was repealed, many firms continued with the practice of providing for 
separate canteens, change houses and toilets.40 He makes an important point in this regard: 
Labour legislation reform – an alteration in the national regime of labour 
regulation – did not necessarily translate into change in the workplace regime. 
Racial identity was constructed by white political, managerial, trade union and 
social power, rather than by the law alone, and it was the basis of that power. 
Power in the workplace was racially constituted.41  
 
At some of the South African factories, workers had the impression that some forms of 
segregation were still practiced in the factories. A worker from a factory in South Africa 
explained: 
We should learn to live together, then we can work together, because it’s not a big 
deal. But the supervisors, they’ve got their own kind of tea that they drink, we’ve 
got our own kind of tea. They drink fresh milk, and we only drink only tea. The 
management drinks even better. You see. I am not saying they must buy us like 
juice and everything - that is expensive - but if we can learn to live together, I 
mean we can work together. They’ve got their own toilets, we’ve got our own 
toilets. Even us shopstewards, we were denied the opportunity to use the toilets up 
                                                 
37 Von Holdt (2003), pp.40-46. 
38 Von Holdt (2003), p.40. 
39 Von Holdt (2003), p.42. 
40 Von Holdt (2003), pp.29-30. 
41 Von Holdt (2003), p.30. 
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there, in the training centre. We were using them before, but all of a sudden they 
said no… During the negotiations we were able to use those toilets, but all of a 
sudden they decided, no, we must not use those toilets. If you want to go to the 
toilet you must like go out and… stuff like that. So it’s not healthy. 
 
From this quotation it is clear that segregation is not always ‘racial’ per se, but rather operates 
along the contours of the company hierarchy. Another interviewee said the following: 
We [African workers] also communicate with them [coloureds and Indians], we 
don’t have a problem - except with the management. Everybody is worried with 
management at this company. But with us as workers we don’t have problems, 
because we eat together… They don’t treat us as tools, because there are whites 
who treat their employees as tools, you see. So you don’t stay with tools - tools 
stay separate. 
 
At another factory, where the canteen was used by workers and management alike, 
management had an earlier lunch time, and after their lunch time, factory workers used the 
canteen. Managers got enamel plates, and workers had to use plastic ones. Again, one has to 
emphasise that the practices are based not on ‘race’ as such, but the company hierarchy. It is 
important to note, however, that workers interpret this as de facto discrimination, since the 
hierarchy is still racialised. 
 
Apart from mentioning specific examples, employees had comments about the general state 
of affairs in their factories, and some linked this to national issues: 
I told you here it’s the racist thing. I have never ever… I have never seen a place 
where apartheid is this bad, never in my life. Now that’s why I was thinking: 
‘Why is it so many farmers getting killed, because now I can see why the white 
people are getting killed on the farms - because of this attitude.’ It is not them, but 
it is the parents that taught them to be like that, you understand? So you can’t 
actually blame him - you have to go deeper… 
 
At the one factory that is owned by a multinational corporation, there was a perception among 
workers that the managers from Europe interacted with workers with more respect than their 
South African counterparts:  
Oh, they [South African managers] can learn a lot – they can learn a lot, you 
know, because if you get like the [managers from Europe coming], when they 
come for the normal visit, [they] come and wish you ‘good-bye, take care they’ll 
see you later, the next turn’. It really puts a [good] feeling in the employee to 
actually… 
In the Zimbabwean factories, workers did not feel that some forms of segregation were 
practiced – this had changed after independence already.  
 
Discrimination on the basis of ‘race’ is no longer legislated in South Africa. It is actively 
discouraged by state policies and legislation has been put in place to bring about ‘employment 
equity’. But workers interpret the segregation of facilities according to the company hierarchy 
as implying that certain elements of racial segregation in the workplace remain. This is true 
for especially the factories in South Africa and Swaziland. Workers hold strong opinions and 
continue to challenge these practices. These continuities may be temporary phenomena that 
form part of a process of decolonisation. Also, the study is based on a sector of one industry 
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only. One cannot generalise the findings – essentially based on opinions expressed during 
interviews – to include all of South Africa. But the perspectives presented here do raise 
important questions about the ability of a particular formation of the post-colonial state to 
‘penetrate’ the workplace. 
 
 
Location Of Workplaces In A Bifurcated Industrial Geography 
Fifth, an important element of the ‘apartheid workplace regime’ was the way factories were 
inserted into the industrial geography of colonialism. Mamdani refers to the bifurcated state, 
and the different logics of colonial rule in urban centres and rural areas.42 In the South African 
context, ‘indirect rule’ took the form of the Bantustans created by the migrant labour system 
and formalised by the apartheid government. Whilst Von Holdt identifies the importance of 
the migrant labour system, he fails to recognise the significance of the apartheid industrial 
geography itself.43 
 
Until the changes to labour laws in 1979, all African workers were excluded from the legal 
definition of ‘employee’. By using strategic court cases combined with a programme of 
mobilisation, the independent trade unions that emerged after the 1973 strike waves were able 
to slowly chip away some of the legal pillars of racial despotism. But accounts of South 
African labour history often fail to consider that a significant number of workers were located 
in areas that were not included in South African labour law. These workers were often in what 
became known as ‘industrial decentralisation zones’ in the so-called ‘homelands’.44 
 
The idea of this kind of ‘spatial fix’ to urban worker militancy predates formal apartheid.45 
Indeed, it was raised for the first time in the 1940s, and a limited process of state support was 
initiated. In the 1960s, the government stepped up its support for ‘border industries’, but 
factories were not located within the borders of Bantustans. Only from the late 1960s to the 
early 1970s were factory owners encouraged to set up shop within the Bantustans themselves. 
This had the added advantage of the location of employment relations outside the scope of the 
reforming South African labour regime. Thus, if one alters Mamdani’s language somewhat, 
whereas workers in urban centres were making progress in achieving some form of industrial 
citizenship, workers in rural areas were very much the subjects of the neo-traditional rulers of 
Bantustans. In the South African context, the way in which the ‘bifurcated state’ shaped the 
industrial geography of apartheid is often ignored by a ‘metro-centric’ approach. 46 
 
Following the spate of liquidations in the late 1990s and the early 2000s, three of the four 
remaining South African factories in this sector of the engineering industry are located in 
these areas. However, the union has been addressing the disparities in wages and conditions 
between these areas and factories located in urban areas. One interviewee still had concerns: 
“We have two other sister-companies… So there is a disparity, the wages are not equal”. 
 
Whereas NUMSA (and its predecessor, the Metal and Allied Workers Union) was able to 
organise urban factories in the 1970s, factories in these former decentralisation areas were 
only organised in the late 1980s. The civil war in the early 1990s in especially KwaZulu-Natal 
                                                 
42 Mamdani (1996). 
43 Von Holdt (2003). 
44 Steven Friedman, Building Tomorrow Today, Johannesburg: Ravan, 1987, p.475; Hart (2002). 
45 See Beverly Silver, Forces of Labor: Workers’ Movements and Globalization since 1870, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
46 See Hart (2002). 
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severely disrupted union activities. However, currently processes of ‘reconciliation’ in the 
workplace are leading to former United Workers Union of South Africa (UWUSA) members 
being organised into the NUMSA structures. An interviewee at one of the factories pointed 
out:  
Even in 1988 when we joined NUMSA nothing [collective barga ining] was 
happening… Then in 1994, that’s where they started to bargain, [later] they joined 
Bargaining Council and the grading system. 
 
As the wage levels at the different production locations in South Africa even out, workers 
interviewed at some of the factories were concerned about whether the company would 
maintain their operations in former Bantustans. This state of affairs is a constant source of 
insecurity, with workers referring to factories that are ‘running away’ from them. Some were 
aware of the fact that the discontinuation of subsidies for companies was putting pressure on 
the industrialisation models followed in the former industrial decentralisation zones. About 
plant closures in one of the areas, an interviewee said: “I think maybe it is because there are 
no company subsidies… There were some subsidies [for] seven years. So I think there are no 
subsidies now”. Some related the closure of companies in this area to racism:  
What makes the companies to close down? The answer is simple. It is the  white 
men who have the money, they do not want the black government. That is why 
they run away with the money and hide it in another place, and sit upon it. That is 
the reason. 
Another:  
What I mean is that business owners think that there is a problem (that they must 
give people jobs). They fight the people because they want to bring back the white 
government. 
 
Whereas the industrial decentralisation zones served as a mechanism to discipline labour in 
the past, this dynamic is now replicated in the Southern African region. In this industry, a 
competing factory was set up in the neighbouring Swaziland in the 1990s. Within two years it 
captured 40% of the South African market. Also, 90% of its produce was exported to South 
Africa. Swaziland is notorious for its labour repressive regime, and South African 
management and trade unions alike raised this issue publicly. 
 
Indeed, interviewees were very much aware of some of these dynamics. One worker said:  
I think the government must try to stop taking goods from other countries and not 
allow so many countries to bring their goods here in South Africa - just because 
our factory are closing down due to that goods from outside the country. 
 
Whereas trade union rights in South Africa are formally recognised, unions in Swaziland still 
have to fight for their right to organise workers. An interviewee at the factory in Swaziland 
did not have a lot of respect for the track record of trade unions in that country: “Unions in 
Swaziland are weak. They are not doing their job – they are not standing for worker’s rights”. 
But the problem was not only a lack of effort from the trade unions. He said: “You should 
remember, this is not a country, it’s a kingdom”. Another said: “The government of 
Swaziland is not giving power to unions”. Indeed, no collective bargaining over wages and 
conditions took place at the factory. Another employee pointed out that there had been a 
union “across the road” which had tried to organise workers at the factory in the past. These 
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attempts were unsuccessful: “[The manager] believes people’s attitudes change when they 
join unions. He promised to look after the employees if they do not join a union”. 
 
Another worker who was interviewed in Swaziland had previously worked in a factory in 
Zimbabwe. In his perspective, unions there were “not weak or powerful”. According to him, 
“there are not that many strikes [in Zimbabwe], but worker’s rights are followed through the 
worker’s committees”. Indeed, workers in Zimbabwe in this industry were organised by the 
National Engineering Workers’ Union (NEWU). Wages were negotiated in the National 
Employment Council for the engineering industry, which basically prescribed minimum 
wages to the industry – very much like the Bargaining Councils in South Africa. However, 
unlike South Africa, collective bargaining for wages did not take place at the factory or 
company level. At this level, permanent workers elected representatives for Worker’s 
Committees. These representatives consulted with management in a Works Council. The 
union as such was not involved in this process. Indeed, according to the managing director of 
one company there, less than 50% of their workforce was unionised. At the other company, 
the firm set their wage levels at a higher rate than the prescribed minimum wages – even for 
contract workers. This was usually discussed in the Works Council. Workers seldom went on 
strike as part of a collective bargaining process, but sometimes engaged in demonstrations and 
sit- ins. Once, when this happened, the company called the police. According to the production 
manager at the plant, unions were “ineffective”. 
 
Thus, as the uneven labour market brought about by the industrial geography of apartheid is 
levelled, the same logic is replicated in the context of Southern Africa, and the availability of 
a state form and labour regime in Swaziland that resembles the former ‘homelands’, enables a 
rearticulation of the logic of the apartheid industrial geography. South Africa’s internal spatial 
fix is externalised to include Swaziland in the case of this sector of the engineering industry, 
but also Lesotho in the case of the textiles and other industries. 
 
Conclusion 
What can we then say about the workplace regime that is constructed on the ruins of the 
apartheid workplace regime? Based on his analysis of a number of workplace restructuring 
exercises at Highveld Steel, Von Holdt identified three possible future trajectories for the 
post-apartheid workplace regime: 
 
First, authoritarian restoration implies a return to the logic of despotism. This would entail 
what Burawoy would term “market despotism”,47 or ‘unitarism’ in the language of industrial 
relations theory. For Von Holdt, in the South African context this implies some kind of neo-
apartheid workplace regime.48 
 
Second, negotiated reconstruction implies cooperation between management and a strong, 
independent trade union so as to establish a less authoritarian workplace regime. For such a 
workplace regime to survive in the long run, the establishment of a more generalised 
‘hegemonic’ regime of control would be required.49 It would have to be supported by a social 
democratic ‘class compromise’. In the language of industrial relations theory, a ‘pluralist’ 
system would be the outcome of such a process. 
 
                                                 
47 Burawoy (1985). 
48 Von Holdt (2003). 
49 See Burawoy (1985). 
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Third, Von Holdt identifies what he calls wildcat cooperation. This is when union members 
buy into managerial ideology and cooperate in restructuring exercises without the union’s 
support. For Burawoy, this implies “hegemonic despotism”, 50 and in the language of 
industrial relations theory, ‘neo-unitarism’. But in some way, this is where this comparison 
between the various theoretical strands discussed here runs into conceptual inconsistencies. 
Indeed, Von Holdt attempted to construct a theoretical language more appropriate in the 
context of the South. ‘Hegemonic despotism’ is a moment that follows the ‘hegemonic’ 
regimes of the North, when the welfare state comes under pressure because of economic 
liberalisation. It is a post-welfare state moment – with cut-backs in social security legitimised 
by the ideology of globalisation. Also, ‘neo-unitarism’ implies a moment that follows 
‘pluralism’ – the re-assertion of unitarism. Von Holdt is careful to point out that the apartheid 
workplace regime was despotic in nature. Can ‘hegemonic despotism’ follow ‘racial 
despotism’ as a regime of control?51  
 
Indeed, one should ask oneself whether these categories help us to understand better what has 
happened in this sector of the engineering industry in South Africa. Also, how do we 
understand this in comparison to Swaziland and Zimbabwe? While the notions of “apartheid 
workplace regime” (Von Holdt) and “colonial despotism” (Burawoy) are useful in describing 
the past, the above categories of possible future trajectories are less helpful. Rather, we are 
forced to consider new concepts. In light of the criticism of South African exceptionalism, the 
concepts ‘post-apartheid workplace regime’ and ‘neo-apartheid workplace regime’ also seem 
inappropriate. Rather than simply authoritarian restoration, negotiated reconstruction or 
wildcat cooperation, or even market despotism, hegemony or hegemonic despotism, we see in 
the context of Southern Africa what one could call a post-colonial workplace regime. 
 
Indeed, this study has shown that in this sector of the engineering industry a number of 
elements of the apartheid workplace regime are reconfigured in new ways – but that this 
process of reconfiguration also mirrors some key characteristics of the logic underlying the 
apartheid workplace regime – there is continuity in change as such. Table 4 summarises the 
argument. 
 
Table 4 - Continuity in Change: From Racial Despotism to the Post-Colonial Workplace 
Regime 
Apartheid workplace regime or racial despotism Post-colonial workplace regime  
Racial division of labour Upward floating colour bar and an informal wage colour bar 
Arbitrary nature of racial structure of power draws on 
the colonial state for legitimacy  
Industrial relations procedures limit arbitrary 
exercise of power. Rearticulated as ‘labour market 
flexibility’ and ideology of globalisation 
Migrant labour 
Migrant labour remains as a characteristic of the 
labour market in Southern Africa, articulates with 
a re-segmented labour market in this sector 
Segregation of facilities in the workplace 
Racially segregated facilities illegal. Segregation 
shifts to class segregation, which often still 
coincides with ‘race’ 
Location in bifurcated industrial geography 
Attempts to level uneven labour markets. 
Rearticulated in context of Southern African 
regional integration – case of Swaziland.   
                                                 
50 Burawoy (1985). 
51 Von Holdt (2003). 
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First, historically the industry emerged as one with workplace regimes based on a racial 
division of labour. In some of the factories, ‘race’ was remoulded, with the position of 
‘coloured’ and ‘Indian’ workers changing over time.52 The ‘racial’ mould is by no means a 
fixed one. But South Africa is not an exception to the rule. In Swaziland workers also fought 
racial discrimination in the workplace, and in Zimbabwe ‘white’ craft unions depended on the 
state to fix the definitions of their deskilled jobs as a defensive strategy against their ‘black’ 
counterparts. 
 
In the context of the post-colonial state, the racial division of labour can no longer be 
legitimised by the state. In fact, policies are put in place to bring about redress. In South 
Africa, legislation aimed at rectifying skills imbalances as well as the promotion of 
employment equity was promulgated. But the post-colonial state does not always have the 
capacity to enforce such legislation, and substantial scope exists for an upward floating colour 
bar and an informal wage colour bar to exist within the informal realms of formal 
organisations. Indeed, whilst the colonial state collapses, the ‘racialised’ post-colonial society 
is quite capable of holding on to colonial values. Of course, trade unions challenge these 
practices in the workplace, and they may only be a temporary phenomenon that follows the 
first decades after independence. Indeed, Zimbabwe constructed a form of state corporatism 
after independence, thus incorporating trade unions into a nationalist project. The positive 
side of this state- led programme should not be ignored. The key difference between South 
Africa and Zimbabwe is that the vocational training system in Zimbabwe was deracialised 
more aggressively than in South Africa. While trade unions remain weak at the level of the 
workplace – a legacy of state corporatism – the ‘racial’ character of despotism in the 
workplace is less harsh than in South Africa. But in the context of the political and economic 
chaos in Zimbabwe, it is difficult to construct a useful comparison. A possible lesson from 
Zimbabwe, however, is that the ‘colour bar’ may shift out of the workplace to the economy as 
such – specifically with regards to ownership – one company is considered to be a ‘black’ 
company, and the other ‘white’. Thus, the politics of ‘race’ remain engrained in post-colonial 
Southern Africa – not only South Africa, even though meanings shift over time. 
 
Second, under colonialism the racial structure of power in the workplace drew on the state for 
legitimacy and formal legal sanction. Under pressures from post-colonial states, this regime 
collapses, and new sources of legitimacy are needed to maintain managerial control over the 
labour process. An important element of racial despotism in the workplace is the fact that 
decisions are made arbitrarily. These essentially pre-bureaucratic forms of work organisation 
are challenged by trade unions, who force companies to sign ‘procedural agreements’, and 
who challenge the absence of formal grading systems, or the anomalies inherent to such 
grading systems once they are implemented. In a way, one might argue that the struggle 
against racial despotism is a struggle for bureaucracy – one that is based on a different logic,  
which is seen as more ‘rational’ by workers. The managerial fix to this challenge is partially 
found in the market, with the introduction of new forms of insecurity – a layer of fixed-term 
contract workers in the case of this industry. Another form of insecurity is the constant threat 
of relocation under the ‘pressure’ of ‘globalisation’. The discourse of colonial management 
fuses with the discourse of globalisation through the language of flexibility. The bureaucratic 
measures that were meant to transform the colonial despotism into some form of post-colonial 
hegemony, are seen as obstacles to productivity and employment. The result is the language 
of the market legitimising the continuing dominance of ‘white’ managers in the workplace, 
and a reassertion of their despotism by using fixed term contracts, threats to relocate, and the 
                                                 
52 See Webster (1985). 
 22
language of neo- liberal globalisation. Thus, the state as locus of racial despotism disappears, 
and the market is used to enforce discipline. 
 
Third, the system of migrant labour is still a major feature of the labour market in the broader 
context of Southern Africa. While this is not a key factor in the case of this sector of the 
engineering industry as such, the system of using fixed-term contracts replicates the dynamic 
of labour market segmentation brought about by the migrant labour system. Where migrant 
workers at one of the factories were at risk of losing not only their jobs, but also their 
accommodation in the hostel on the firm’s premises in the past, a new layer of vulnerable 
‘STC’ workers are subjected to the threat of exclusion. 
 
Fourth, the segregation of facilities on the basis of ‘race’ becomes illegal. But we see that 
some petty past practices still persist. Segregated facilities in the workplace are justified on 
the basis of seniority. In the context of informal colour bars, this remains a very sensitive 
issue in the workplace – but, as mentioned, less so in Zimbabwe. 
 
Fifth, the location of the industry in a bifurcated industrial geography is replicated in the 
context of regional integration. This should be understood in the context of the somewhat 
different post-colonial routes the countries took. In Swaziland, the monarch succeeded in 
establishing his hegemony through traditionalism. In the realm of industrial relations, a 
‘traditionalist unitarism’ was established, building on key elements of colonial despotism. As 
a form of state, post-colonial Swaziland maintains the bifurcation brought about by colonial 
land and labour policies. Ironically, the monarchy’s bourgeois nature is entrenched by the 
maintenance of this distinction. Allowing for trade unions and parliamentary democracy 
would undermine this arrangement, and unions are thus actively discouraged from organising 
‘the friends of the King’s’ factories. This creates the space for the South African system of 
industrial decentralisation to be replicated in the Kingdom, with the industrial relations 
practices that are associated with that. 
 
When the post-apartheid government came to power in South Africa, there were attempts to 
put in place a broader set of institutions to support such reconstruction of the workplace. But 
the establishment of these institutions were premised on false assumptions. The extent to 
which trade unions were able to establish such ‘rational’ procedures in the workplace was 
overestimated. Many sectors of the economy were never organised, and because of the nature 
of the apartheid industrial geography, significant spaces of the manufacturing industry were 
located outside the national regime. 
 
The authors of the labour laws assumed that one would be able to convince the players that 
the establishment of new institutions, or bureaucracies, in the workplace would be to their 
benefit – in the long run – even if they were not established yet. Therefore the Labour 
Relations Act of 1995 contained significant elements of social engineering, specifically 
Chapter 5 that deals with so called ‘workplace forums’. The hope was that generalised 
exercises of ‘negotiated reconstruction’ would add up to become a social trend, and in this 
way create the high road of post-Fordism. A better understanding of the emerging post-
colonial workplace regime in South Africa equips us with more appropriate theoretical tools 
to understand the limits to the post-Fordist strategy. Indeed, the post-colonial workplace 
regime is quite able to contain elements of ‘negotiated reconstruction’, ‘authoritarian 
restoration’ or ‘wildcat cooperation’ – often simultaneously, but also at different times. A 
strategy of authoritarian restoration, as in the case of a number of factories in this industry, 
often leads to stalemate and continued ungovernability in the workplace. The trade union was 
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able to extract some concessions from management – significantly a process to address the 
wage anomalies the union found so offensive. Thus, workers actively resist attempts at 
authoritarian restoration. But because of the ongoing stalemate, the resulting resistant work 
culture is not conducive to significant increases in productivity based on worker cooperation 
and initiative. However, even if firms shift their approach to one of negotiated reconstruction, 
the question remains as to how sustainable such an approach would be in the context of an 
absence of state structures to sustain large-scale transformation. Islands of cooperation in a 
sea of despotism do not really change landscapes – they lead to the enclave economies created 
by settler colonial societies based on the logic of simultaneous inclusion and exclusion. Only 
now the ‘racial’ dimension may be less pronounced, even though historical tension will 
remain and flare up at certain times. 
 
Indeed, the key to understanding the continuities with the apartheid workplace regime lies in 
seeing South Africa as part of a Southern African political economy, historically tied together 
through processes of colonial conquest and the establishment of a relatively cohesive settler 
society with its own identity. In the context of the ‘Northern’ metropolis, hegemonic regimes 
of control slowly give way to hegemonic despotism. In the former colonies, colonial 
despotism gives way to a market despotism that reinforces some of the key characteristics of 
colonialism. This is what characterises the post-colonial workplace regime – the rearticulation 
of past logics within a process of change. 
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